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SUBJECT PSP Plans for the 1952 Election  
in Cuba  
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SUPPLEMENT TO  
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1. In the political meetings held at the Partido Socialista Popular (PSP) headquarters in Habana, Cuba on 15 and 16 September Blas Roca pointed out that, unless the opposition parties united against the government, the government party would win. He reached this conclusion by estimating that the Ortodoxo Party would be able to get 500,000 votes, while the combined parties of Batista and Castellanos would be able to obtain around 400,000 votes. However, with the increase in population and consequent increase in the electoral vote, the government would be able to get around 700,000 votes and win the election. Considering this state of affairs, Roca emphasized the danger that exists today for the PSP if its present life of persecution, as well as its present economic and political stagnation, continues. The solution to its present difficulties, therefore, is in the formation of a Frente Democratico Nacional, made up of opposition parties, in order to win over the government in the next elections. For this reason the PSP should do everything possible to convince the other opposition parties of the urgent necessity of uniting, since this is the only way in which the government party can be defeated. Roca pointed out that the Partido Accion Unitaria (PAU), of Batista, and the Partido Nacional Cubano (PNC), of Castellanos, have a pact, but that these two alone would not be able to win out against the government. He further stated that, unless a union were made with the Ortodoxos, no opposition party would win in the coming elections.
2. In this connection the Party will immediately initiate Comites de Unidad such as was done in the mayoralty campaign for Habana in June 1950. These Comites de Unidad, formed in the workshops, factories, and central and municipal barrios, will agitate for a Frente Democratico Nacional, having as a minimum ideological base a "popular and progressive national policy" combined with an "international policy of peace and friendship". Although the formation of these Comites de Unidad will be carried out immediately, it was understood that they might not be able to fulfill their agitation activities successfully alone. Therefore, it was agreed that the Communist Congressional representative in each province would attend the meetings held under the auspices of the various Comites de Unidad. Prior to the occasion all preparations for the meeting will be carried out by local militant members. It is felt that there would be little difficulty in gaining permission from Mayor Castellanos for such meetings in the City of Habana. In the interior the PSP municipal councilmen will have the task of getting permits from the various mayors. This, with the permission of the local mayors and by holding

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-2-

their meetings under the "direction" and "responsibility" of the Party Congressional representatives, they hope to avoid suspension of the meetings by the local police.

3. Blas Roca also spoke about the clandestine work of the Party and pointed out that the Party should continue to carry on this work to successful completion so that all the active Communists designated for this work can familiarize themselves with the clandestine organization while the Party still retains its legality.
4. An intense campaign should be initiated by the Party to get more affiliates, primarily to swell its ranks and to use this added number of voters as a wedge for getting political concessions from other opposition parties when and if they unite against the government in the elections of 1952. Roca declared that, despite the Party's previous unfortunate experience with Lukowam affiliates in 1950, there was no reason to fear a recurrence of the events of 1950 because the present affiliates do not have anything to do with the political policy of the PSP, and the Party already has in reserve a clandestine organization. Roca therefore recommended that the Party initiate an intense campaign to get at least 140,000 affiliates.
5. Roca then spoke about the financial strain on the Party funds brought about by the expenses of publishing Ultima Hora and Boh. It was agreed to keep both papers going in any way possible, and to require the militant Communists to commit themselves, still further, in selling subscriptions, door-selling campaigns and other fund-raising methods will be organized to bring the Party sufficient money to continue the publishing of its newspapers. It was considered, however, that the Party should maintain the appearance of the "independent" policy of Ultima Hora in order to keep it from suffering suppression along with Boh. Therefore, it would be essential to limit the publicity of the fund-raising campaigns to Boh alone, the Party later assigning amounts to both Boh and Ultima Hora.
6. It was also agreed that the Juventud Socialista would continue penetrating non-Communist youth groups in the other opposition parties. Prior to that time the Juventud Socialista had received instructions to create joint youth committees with other youth groups. In Blas Roca's opinion the most important examples of this are the Parlamento de la Juventud and the Comité Juvenil de Partidarios de la Raz. Able and intelligent members of the Juventud Socialista, who were of voting age and little known outside of the JS, would be chosen to affiliate with other opposition parties, particularly the Ortodoxo and the PAB, for the purpose of militating within these ranks for a pact with the JS in a united front against the government. Likewise it was decided to instruct the militant members of the Federación Democrática de Mujeres Cubanas (FDMC) who had connections with the opposition parties to militate also for a Frente Democrático Nacional. For example, Maria Luisa Hernandez, Senora Emilia Golicochea, Senora Maria Suazo, Esperanza Salas, Senora Garcia Gonzalez, and Senora Juana Vidas, all either affiliates or militant members of the JS, assigned to the FDMC, give the impression of being affiliated with various non-Communist political parties, and at the same time carry out their Communist activities. By affiliating with the non-Communist political parties these women will be able to develop among the female members of these parties a sympathy for uniting with the Communists.

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